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Political Campaigning and the Airways
HARROP FREEMAN*
STEWART EDELSTEIN**
The political year of 1972 has faded into history, but the night-
mare or unsolved problems for the broadcasting media, politicians
and listener-viewers remain vivid. The specters of meaningless
promises, of charges and counter-charges, of unexplained scandals,
of inability to produce confrontation, of media intimidation, and of
broadcasting snarls glimmer in memory of a constant reminder of
the power of television and radio in a democratic society, of the
phenomenal cost of current campaigning, of the advantages of the
in-party, of influence of wealth, and of the inadequacy of existing
statutes and rules applicable to political broadcasting. That some-
thing substantial must be done before 1976, and probably before
1974 elections, is obvious to 'all.
The purpose of this article is to define the cause of controversy
as to political broadcasting engendered by section 315 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act 1 and related rules, to describe the power
* A.B., Cornell University, 1929; LL.B., 1930; J.S.D., 1945; Professor of
Law, Cornell Law School; Member New York State Bar.
* * J.D., Cornell Law School, 1973; currently with Cohn and Wolf,
Bridgeport, Connecticut.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 315, as reproduced in the FCC's Public Notice entitled
"Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office",
37 Fed. Reg. 5793 (March 16, 1972), reads as follows (italics indicate
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and cost of political television and radio broadcasting, and to dis-
cuss various proposals for changing section 315 (by suspension, re-
peal or by various modifications). Finally, a solution to the polit-
ical broadcasting morass will be suggested.
the amended provisions effective April 7, 1972, and previously existing
law deleted by the Campaign Communications Reform Act is enclosed in
brackets) :
SEC. 315. (a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is
a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broad-
casting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting sta-
tion: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censor-
ship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this sec-
tion. No obligation is hereby imposed under this subsection upon
any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-(1) Bona fide newscast,
(2) Bona fide news interview,
(3) Bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the
candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or sub-jects covered by the news documentary), or
(4) On-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (included
but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental
thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within
the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence
shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with
the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documen-
taries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obliga-
tion imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public in-
terest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.
[(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting station
for any of the purposes set forth in this section shall not exceed
the charges made for comparable use of such station for other pur-
poses.]
(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcast station by
any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public of-
fice in connection with his campaign for nomination for election,
or election, to such office shall not exceed-(1) During the 45 days preceding the date of a primary or pri-
mary runoff election and during the 60 days preceding the date
of a general or special election in which such person is a candidate,
the lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount
of time for the same period; and
(2) At any other time, the charges made for comparable use of
such station by other users thereof.
(c) No station licensee may make any charge for the use of
such station by or on behalf of any legally qualified candidate
for Federal elective office (or for nomination to such office) un-
less such candidate (or a person specifically authorized by such
candidate in writing to do so) certifies to such licensee in writing
that the payment of such charge will not violate any limitation
specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 104(a) of the Cam-
paign Communications Reform Act, whichever paragraph is appli-
cable.
THE CONTROVERSY
Few appear to be satisfied with the equal time provision of the
Communication Act,2 or with the application of the "fairness" doc-
trine,8 or even with the 1972 Federal Election Campaign Act.
4
Speaking of section 315, CBS president, Frank Stanton, says:
"the device backfired" by requiring "equal time to the most trivial
(d) If a state by law and expressly-
(1) Has provided that a primary or other election for any of-
fice of such State or of a political subdivision thereof is subject to
this subsection,
(2) Has specified a limitation upon total expenditures for the
use of broadcasting stations on behalf of the candidacy of each le-
gally qualified candidate in such election,
(3) Has provided in any such laws an unequivocal expression
of intent to be bound by the provisions of this subsection, and
(4) Has stipulated that the amount of such limitation shall not
exceed the amount which would be determined for such election
under section 104(a) (1) (B) or 104(a) (2) (B) (whichever is applica-
ble) of the Campaign Communications Reform Act had such elec-
tion been an election for a Federal elective office or nomination
thereto,
then no station licensee may take any charge for the use of such
station by or on behalf of any legally qualified candidate in such
election unless such candidate (or a person specifically authorized
by such candidate in writing to do so) certifies to such licensee
in writing that the payment of such charge will not violate such
State limitation.
(c) Whoever wilfully and knowingly violates the provisions of
subsection (c) or (d) of this section shall be punished by a fine
not to exceed $5,000 or imprisonment for a period not to exceed five
years, or both. The provisions of sections 501 through 503 of this
Act shall not apply to violations of either such subsection.
(f) (1) For the purposes of this section:
(A) The term 'broadcasting station' includes a community an-
tenna television system.
(B) The terms 'licensee' and 'station licensee' when used with
respect to a community antenna television system, -means the
operator of such system.
(C) The term 'Federal elective office' means the office of Pres-
ident of the United States, or of Senator or Representative in,
or Resident Commissioner or Delegate to, the Congress of the
United States.
(2) For purposes of subsections (c) and (d), the term 'legally
qualified candidate' means any person who (A) meets the qualifi-
cations prescribed by the applicable laws to hold the office for
which he is a candidate and (B) is eligible under applicable State
law to be voted for by the electorate directly or by means of dele-
gates or electors.
[ (c)] (g) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.
Hereafter, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) shall be referred to as "§ 315."
2. Id.
3. Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1962), amending
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1934). The fairness doctrine requires licensees to broad-
cast contrasting views on "controversial" issues of public importance,
providing fair and reasonable opportunity for spokesmen of various sides
of these issues. It is an issue oriented doctrine which is applicable at all
times rather than at special times such as political campaigns; Red Lion
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
4. 2 U.S.C. 421, et seq. (1972).
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and irresponsible candidates" or in the alternative the denial of
time "to the busy and distinguished men and women seriously as-
piring to serve their nation . . . . " Nathan Karp of the Socialist
Labor Party, on the other hand, views any change in section 315 with
concern, emphasizing that the section's purpose was not so much to
assure candidates equal time as "to protect the people's right to
hear, see and consider the widely divergent viewpoints." Recently
Senator Pastore, chairman of the Senate Communications Subcom-
mittee, introduced a bill to amend section 315, in the hopes of low-
ering cost, assuring more free time and placing an overall ceiling
on media spending.7
These representative quotations highlight the controversy over
section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, the provision which
mandates that if a licensee permits any legally qualified candidate
for any office to use a broadcast station, with certain exceptions,
he must provide equal opportunities to all other candidates for that
office. No obligation is imposed upon any broadcasting licensee to
allow the use of its station by any such candidate; but if the licensee
gives time to one candidate, it must give the same time to all other
legally qualified candidates, or if a licensee sells time to one candi-
date, it must offer to sell time to all other legally qualified candi-
dates.8
Section 315 is susceptible to broad attack in that its inade-
quacies are written into its very terms: it does not compel the media
to air an issue, no matter how important; it does not provide free
time; it tends to encourage competition in spending; it does not
really concern itself with the public's right to hear and see; it gives
the in-power party and the candidate who can best create "news" a
home-free advantage; it does not assure concerned and able citi-
zens not running for office an opportunity to reply to candidates'
broadcasts.
Section 315 was adopted with a dual purpose: (1) to assure equal-
5. Statement before the Subcommittee on Communications, House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, March 4, 1963, quoted in R.
MAcNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE: THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMER-
ICAN POLITICS, 282 (1968).
6. J. PENNYBACKER AND W. BRADEN, EDS., BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, 141 (1969).
7. S. B. 372, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
8. Supra, note 1.
ity for minority party candidates and ban discriminatory coverage
of the campaigns; and (2) to provide reasonable opportunity for
the public to become informed of political candidates and events.9
Considering only the first objective, section 315 does not go far
enough. A licensee must provide equal time only where it gives
(as opposed to sells) time to one candidate. If a licensee sells time
to a candidate, it must provide the same opportunity to buy time
to other legally qualified candidates. Of course, if a candidate can-
not afford to buy the time, the "equal" opportunity is no oppor-
tunity at all. Furthermore, the 1959 amendments to section 315,
which exempt boda fide newscasts, news interviews, news docu-
mentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events, favor
those in the news.10
If the second objective is to inform the public as completely as
practicable about the candidates who have the greatest chance of
becoming the next elected official, then section 315 goes much too
far: it should apply only to the major party candidates. But if
the objective is to inform the public about the widely divergent
political views represented by the various political parties and the
political issues, then section 315 does not go far enough because it al-
lows the two major parties to dominate the airways and excludes
non-candidates.
The legislative history of section 315, originally derived from sec-
tion 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, reveals both objectives of section
315: to give candidates equal opportunity and to inform the public."'
Informing the public fairly was the original intent of Senator
Howell in urging the passage of section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927.
He warned, in the 1926 legislative debate over this section, that "in
the hands of a comparatively few interests, the opportunity of
reaching the public by radio and allowing them alone to determine
what the public shall hear is a tremendously dangerous course for
Congress to pursue.' 12
In 1959, an FCC decision which considered only the objective of
providing equal opportunity to candidates resulted in an amend-
ment to section 315 to serve the objective of informing the public.
9. Matter of Petitions of Columbia Broadcasting Company for Recon-
sideration and Motions for Declaratory Rulings on Orders Relating to
Applicability of Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, to Newscasts by Broadcast Licensee, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 70
(1959). See e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 13171 (July 28, 1959).
10. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1-4).
11. For a detailed account of the legislative history of § 315, see Felix
v. Westinghouse Radio Station, Inc., 186 F.2d 1, 3-6 (3rd Cir. 1950).
12. 67 CONG. REC. 12502 (1926).
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In the famous Lar Daly decision,"1 the FCC ruled that Lar Daly,
the American First candidate for Mayor of Chicago (who often cam-
paigned in an Uncle Sam suit), was entitled to free television time
corresponding to the time which a CBS licensee had devoted in a
news program to Mayor Daly opening Chicago's March of Dimes
drive and making other ceremonial appearances. One writer de-
scribed this decision as "so widely ridiculed that there was specula-
tion that it was a deliberate attempt by the Commissioners to. bring
the issue to a head."'1 4 President Eisenhower called it absurd. 15
Senator Pastore, in the legislative debate over section 315 which
was sparked by the Lar Daly decision, stated: "If it is desired to
place a blackout on the people of this country, if we want to stop
all important news of political campaigns getting to the American
people, let the Lar Daly decision stand."' 6
In 1959 Congress, in reaction to Lar Daly, amended section 315
by exempting from the equal opportunity provision any bona fide
newscast, bona fide news interview, bona fide news documentary
where the appearance of a candidate is incidental to presentation
of the subject matter, and on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news
events. 17 The Senate Report on these amendments stated: "It
should be noted that the programs that are being exempted in this
legislation have one thing in common: they are generally news and
information-type programs designed to disseminate information
to the public."' 8
In a recent attempt to alter section 315, the sole objective of in-
forming the public was clearly stated: "Equal time was not con-
ceived to serve candidates for public office. Equal time was de-
signed to serve the public."'19 Dean Burch, Chairman of the FCC,
told Congress that the first objective of any change in section 315
should be "to promote the widest and most penetrating airing pos-
sible of views and issues in an election. '20 Furthermore, as the
13. 26 F.C.C. 715, 18 R.R. 701 (1959).
14. R. MACNEiL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE: THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION
ON AMERICAN POITICS 284 (1968).
15. E. BARNOUW, THE IMAGE EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN
THE UNITED STATES 161 (1940).
16. 105 CONG. REC. 14456 (1959).
17. See 47 U.S.C. 315(a) (1-4) (1972).
18. S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1959).
19. S. REP. No. 994, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1962).
20. Hearings on Political Broadcasting Before the Subcomm. on Corn-
Supreme Court stated in New York Times v. Sullivan, there is a
"profound national commitment that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'21 These selections from
section 315's legislative history demonstrate that the emphasis of
section 315 must be to inform the public, not just to achieve equal-
ity between two candidates.
If we are to accomplish the goal of modifying section 315 so as to
promote the widest and most penetrating airing of views and is-
sues, it is first necessary to understand the power of television in
a campaign and to understand the relation between television costs
and the fantastic amount of money necessary to conduct a cam-
paign.
THE POWER OF TELEVISION
As one commentator states:
"At almost no other time are the power and benefits of television
and radio in a democratic society so apparent. '22 The power
and benefits of television are unparalleled; ninety-five percent of
all American homes have television sets. The average American
home has its television turned on more than five and a half hours a
day, seven days a week. An adult American spends more time
in watching television than in any other activity except sleeping
and working.2 3
Not only is television available in nearly every American house-
hold and used extensively, it is, according to a Roper survey, a
source of most news for 59% of those polled (compared with 49%
for newspapers, 25% for radio, 7% for magazines) and considered
by 44% of those polled the most believable news medium (com-
pared with 21% for newspapers, 11% for magazines, 8% for radio).
Sixty-five percent of those polled indicated they gained the clearest
understanding of national candidates and issues from television.2 4
munications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1970).
21. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
22. The Making of Presidents is Hard Work in Radio-TV, BROAD-
CASTING, October 23, 1972, at 18.
23. See Hearings on H.R. 13721 and S. 2637 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 7 (1970) (Statement of Dean Burch,
Chairman, FCC); see also the Nielsen report cited in D. DUNN (THE BROOK-
INGS INSTITUTION), FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, 27-8 (1972); B.
ROPER, A TEN-YEAR VIEW OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS TELEVISION AND
OTHER MASS MEDIA, 1959-1968, 6 (1969); Alexander, Communications and
Politics: The Media and the Message 34 Law & CONTEMP. PROB. 255
(1969).
24. B. ROPER, A TEN-YEAR VIEW OF PUBLC ATTITUDES TOWARD TELEVI-
SION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA, 1959-1968 (1969). A useful chart indicating
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The influence of television campaigns has been aptly described by
Herbert E. Alexander, a foremost authority on political campaign-
ing:
Television has changed the political campaign, changed the politi-
cal candidate, and, in fact, changed the entire nature of the politi-
cal discourse. Television has reordered the political campaign. Itin-
eraries, speeches, and the nominating conventions are planned ac-
cording to the dictates of prime time. Campaigners design methods
for getting exposure on newscasts: some of the best practitioners
the news-disseminating function of television is reproduced in VOTERS'
TIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FuND COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN
COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIc ERA (Table 1) (1969).
Table 1MASS MEDIA AS SOURCES OF NEWS (Roper Polls)
(per cent)
A. Source of Most News 1959 1961 1963 1964 1967 1968
Television 51 52 55 58 64 59
Newspapers 57 57 53 56 55 49
Radio 34 34 29 26 28 25
Magazines 8 9 6 8 7 7
People 4 5 4 5 4 5
Don't know; no answer 1 3 3 3 2 3
B. Most Believable 1959 1961 1963 1964 1967 1968
Television, 29 39 36 41 41 44
Newspapers 32 24 24 23 24 21
Magazines 10 10 10 10 8 11
Radio 12 12 12 8 7 8
Don't know; no answer 17 17 18 18 20 16
C. Major Sources of News about Candidates
1. STATE OFFICES 2. LOCAL OFFICES 3. NATIONAL OFFICES
1964 1968 1964 1968 1964 1968
Television 43 42 Television 27 26 Television 64 65
Newspapers 41 37 Newspapers 42 40 Newspapers 36 24
Radio 10 6 Radio 10 6 Radio 9 4
People 8 9 People 18 23 People 4 4
Magazines 1 1 Magazines 1 1 Magazines 6 5
Other 4 4 Other 7 4 Other 3 2
D. Sources Giving Clearest Understanding
of National Issues and Candidates
1964 1968
Television 51 57
Newspapers 26 23
Magazines 10 10
Radio 6 4
SOURCE: BURNS W. ROPER, A TEN-YEAR VIEw OF PuBLic ATTITUDES To-
WARD TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA, 1959-1968, A Report by Roper Re-
search Associates, Television Information Office, New York, 1969.
NOTE: Since multiple answers were accepted, some of the columns total
more than 100 per cent. The source does not explain why some columns
total less than 100 per cent.
of the political art claim that a few minutes on the evening news
are worth all the rest of the publicity they can get-or can buy.25
A recent example of the power of television in getting the atten-
tion of a large number of potential voters is that Senator McGov-
ern, in mid-October, 1972, attracted an audience estimated at at
least thirty million during a half-hour prime-time telecast.26 An-
other example is former Governor John Connally's half-hour
prime-time October 20, 1972, broadcast for Democrats for Nixon.
Mr. Connally was described as "TV's newest superstar, second, in
fact, only to Archie Bunker" for his thirty point Nielsen rating
in New York.27 In the 1972 presidential election, extensive use
was made of television, particularly by the Democrats. One com-
mentator noted that "Political programs in the last days of this
year's campaign are so frequent they've begun to look like regu-
larly scheduled series." 28
Thus, it is clear that to promote the widest and most penetrating
airing of views and issues in an election, television will play the
decisive role. But what is the cost? To deal intelligently with
proposals for modifying section 315, one must know the expense of
television campaigning.
THE COST
The editors of The Progressive recently referred to politics as
"a growth industry. 2 9 Total campaign expenditures for all offices
were $140 million in 1952, $300 million in 1968 and a projected $400
million in 1972.30 The Citizens' Research Foundation's estimate for
25. Alexander, Communications and Politics: The Media and the Mes-
sage, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 255, 260 (1969). One notable exception to
planning nominating conventions according to the dictates of prime time is
the 1972 Democratic Convention, which climaxed at about 3:00 A.M.
26. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 16, 1972, at 17.
27. BROADCASTING, Oct. 30, 1972, at 20.
28. BROADCASTING, October 30, 1972, at 19. See also The Campaign
Gets Hotter, BROADCASTING, Oct. 9, 1972; Nixon, McGovern, Rush to the
Tube in Closing Week, BROADCASTING, Nov. 6, 1972, at 25.
29. Knoll, Bucks and Ballots, THE PROGRESSIVE, January, 1970, at 10.
30. Id. A table reproduced in VOTERS' TIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA
(Table 4) (1969) shows the great increase in recent years in campaign ex-
penditures:
DIRECT CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES Table 4
BY NATIONAL-LEVEL COMMITTEES, 1912-1968a(millions of dollars)
1912 $ 2.9 1944 $ 7.7
1916 4.7 1948 7.8
1920 6.9 1952 11.6
1924 6.4 1956 12.9
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1972 is even higher: over $420 million1.3
According to the Government Accounting Office figures, a total
of $35,178,792 was spent by four GOP committees to re-elect Presi-
dent Nixon after the campaign spending law went into effect
April 7, 1972. Of this amount, $4,392,644 went to communications
media. Senator McGovern spent a total of $18,475,912, about one-
half the Nixon amount, but spent more than President Nixon
($6,042,204) on communications media. 32 This difference in media
expense is partly due to President Nixon's preference to radio in
making his appeal. These broadcast expenditures, totalling over
$10 million, represent a continuing increase over the broadcast ex-
penses incurred by the presidential candidates in 1968 (about $8
million) and in 1964 (less than $4 million).
Broadcasting costs are the single largest item in most statewide
and national campaign budgets.3 3 Broadcast expenditures are also
increasing at a rapid rate. According to the Brookings Institution,
broadcast expenditures for all candidates in 1956 were less than
$10 million; for 1960-over $14 million; for 1964-over $24 million;
1928 11.6 1960 19.9
1932 5.1 1964 24.8
1936 14.1 1968 44.2
1940 7.8
a Direct expenditures exclude transfers to candidates and committees.
Expenditures by national-level committees are primarily for presidential
and vice presidential candidates; they do not, however, include expenditures
at state and local levels in behalf of national candidates.
31. The Disgrace of Campaign Financing, TIME, Oct. 23, 1972, at 24.
At the time of writing it is not known if these estimates are accurate.
Final reports on receipts and expenditures are due from campaign com-
mittees on Jan. 31, 1973.
32. Nixon Outspends McGovern in Total but Not on Air, BROADCAST-
ING, Nov. 13, 1972, at 20. For a sense of perspective, it is interesting to
note that Proctor and Gamble Co. spends more than half as much in its
annual advertising budget as the entire nation spends in its political cam-
paigns. See The Disgrace of Campaign Financing, TIME, Oct. 23, 1972,
at 30.
33. Squier, Lowering the Cost of Buying Democracy, in THE POLIT-
ICAL IMAGE MERCHANTS: STRATEGIES IN THE NEW POLTICS, 108 (R. Hiebert
ed. 1971). For an interesting comparison of expenses with a past campaign
see Alexander and Meyers, The Switch in Campaign Giving, in FORTUNE,
Nov. 1965, in which there is a breakdown of expenses released by the Re-
publican National Committee after the Goldwater defeat which reveals
that of the approximately $14 million spent for Goldwater, almost 40%
went to television and radio.
for 1968-over $40 million. This increase of over 400% during this
twelve year period compares with about a 100% increase in estimat-
ed total candidate expenses. 34 The significance of such increase can
be seen most graphically in the comparison chart prepared by
34. D. DUNN (THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION), FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS 32 (1972). The increase in broadcast costs from 1955 to 1968 are
shown in the following tables from VOTERS' TIME: REPORT OF THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY FUND COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIC
ERA (Tables 2 and 3) (1969):
CHARGES FOR BROADCASTS, GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS,
BY PARTY, 1956-1968
(thousands of dollars)
A. Television 1956 1960 1964 1968
NETWORKS:
Republicans $ 1,733 $ 1,820 $ 1,912 $ 4,189
Democrats 1,197 1,107 1,895 2,501
Other - - - 672
2,931 2,927 3,807 7,362
STATIONS:
Republicans 2,004 3,611 7,519 10,994
Democrats 1,549 3,308 5,820 7,923
Other 152 206 350 808
3,705 7,125 13,689 19,725
TELEVISION, TOTAL:
Republicans 3,737 5,431 9,431 15,183
Democrats 2,746 4,415 7,715 10,424
Other 152 206 350 1,480
6,636 10,052 17,496 27,087
B. Radio 1956 1960 1964 1968
NETWORKS:
Republicans 145 45 89 469
Democrats 176 34 31 178
Other - - - 16
321 79 119 663
STATIONS:
Republicans 1,500 2,083 3,513 6,853
Democrats 1,198 1,756 3,267 4,846
Other 164 225 209 954
2,861 4,064 6,988 12,654
CHARGES FOR BROADCASTS,
TO PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANTS,
PRIMARIES AND GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, 1964 AND 1968
(thousands of dollars)
A. Television 1964 1968
NETWORKS:
Primaries:
Republicans $ 257 $ 1,008
Democrats - 511
Other -
257 1,519
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The Brookings Institution.A5 Some of the statistics underlying this
chart are that in 1968 the broadcast industry reported total charges
for political broadcasting to be 70% higher than in 1964. In 1968 TV
General campaigns:
Republicans 1,912 4,189
Democrats 1,895 2,501
Other 
- 672
3,807 7,362
Networks, total:
Republicans 2,168 5,197
Democrats 1,895 3,012
Other 
- 672
4,064 8,881
STATIONS:
Primaries:
Republicans 637 1,514
Democrats 245 2,887
Other 64 267
946 4,668
General campaigns:
Republicans 3,205 4,818
Democrats 1,870 1,974
Other 13 484
5,089 7,276
Stations, total:
Republicans 3,842 6,332
Democrats 2,115 4,861
Other 78 751
6,035 11,944
35. Indicators of Campaign Costs Compared with
Other National Indicators, 1956-68
1956 = 100
0 100 200 300 400
SI I
Presidential television time costs
1956
1964
1968
Presidential campaign costs
1956
1960
1964
1968
Spot television time costs
1956
1960
1964
1968
broadcasting accounted for $38 million, or about 65% of the total.A6
Political broadcast advertising in the 1970 campaign surged to
about $58 million, almost double that of the 1966 non-presidential
campaigns.37 It is important to remember that in addition to tele-
vision time, a candidate must cover the cost of production. For
example, the expense to Senator McGovern for a half-hour na-
tional television speech on CBS during prime-time in early Octo-
ber, 1972, is estimated at $110,000. Production costs are estimated
to have been between $10,000 and $15,000.38
But production expenses are not the only secondary expense in-
volved in television broadcasting. One author noted that:
Television is a principal factor in this escalation (of campaign
costs). It is not simply the money spent on buying television time
but the fact that television has created an entirely new syndrome
Gross national product
1956
1960
1964
1968
Number or Households with television
1956
1960
1964
1968
Consumer price index
1956
1960
1964
1968
Voting age population
1956
1960
1964
1968
SOURCE: Consumer price index from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONTINUATION TO 1962 AND
REvISIONS, p. 19, and STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969,
p. 345; gross national product from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT ... 1969, p. 311,
and HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957,
p. 139; number of households with television from NIELSEN TV 1969 (New
York: A. C. Nielsen Co.); population of voting age from STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT . . . 1969, p. 368; spot television time costs from Table 3; presi-
dential campaign costs and presidential television time costs from Table 1.
36. FCC NEWS RELEASE No. 36, 689, Aug. 27, 1970. See also GELLER,
Political Broadcasts-A Few Short Steps Forward, 20 CATH. U.L. REV.
449 (1971).
37. M. MCCARTHY, ELECTIONS FOR SALE 17 (1972). It is interesting to note
that the actual number of hours of political broadcasting in 1970 sharply
declined. The greater expenditure was due to greater use of costly spot
announcements. The 1972 presidential campaign brought a resurgence of
longer political broadcasts, particularly during the closing weeks of the
campaign when half-hour, prime-time programs were broadcast. See
supra note 21.
38. BROADCASTING, Oct. 16, 1972, at 17.
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of campaign costs. Because of television, large sums of money are
now spent on advertising firms, opinion surveys, film and videotape
production, and, recently, computers. Higher costs of telephones,
printing, mailing, salaries, jet transportation, office rental, and in-
cidentals like renting typewriters and feeding staff, have all con-
tributed to campaign-cost inflation. But television is the great
squanderer both in itself and by encouraging a more extravagant
mode of campaigning. 39
Broadcasting costs will probably continue to increase, not only as
an extension of the current trend, but also due to technological
advances. "Color television has already brought higher time and
production costs. Community antenna or cable television (CATV)
facilities promise more broadcasting opportunities once the cities
are wired and particular disctricts can be reached exclusively.
Cable television permits the candidate to broadcast very specific
appeals to a limited number of carefully selected households. '40
These high campaign costs reduce access to television, limit the
number of potential candidates for elective office, and invite corrup-
tion. Regarding television access, John F. Kennedy wrote a year
before his election: "If all candidates and parties are to have
equal access to this essential and decisive campaign medium (tele-
vision) without becoming deeply obligated to the big financial con-
tributors from the worlds of business, labor or other major lob-
bies, then the time has come when a solution must be found to
this problem of TV costs.4 1
Congressman James C. Wright, Texas Democrat, wrote in 1967
that "the price of campaigning has risen so high that it actually
imperils the integrity of our political institutions. Big contributors
more and more hold the keys to the gates of public service. This
is choking off the well-springs of fresh, new thought, and severely
limiting the field of choice available to the public. '42  A recent
study by The Brookings Institution found that:
39. R. MAcNEIL, supra note 7, at 228. For an elaborate analysis of
broadcast expenditures, see H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1968 ELECTION
94-105 (1971); Alexander, Communications and Politics: The Media and
the Message, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 255, 266 (1969).
40. Alexander, Communications and Politics: The Media and the
Message, 34 LAW & CorEMP. PROB. 255, 266 (1969).
41. THE REPORTER, Feb. 16, 1960, at 20.
42. R. Drummond, Campaign Costs, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr.
24, 1967. A similar idea is expressed in a recent article, The Disgrace of
Campaign Financing, TIME, Oct. 23. 1972, at 30: "The threat to democ-
racy is not posed by the amount of money needed to campaign; it lies
The nonwealthy man desiring to contest for office must appeal to
the wealthy for funds. Many aspirants may not meet whatever
set of criteria the wealthy choose to impose. This adds an unde-
sirable component to the electoral process, for voters do not partici-
pate in this exercise. By giving the wealthy veto power over who
may contest, high campaign costs grant them greater influence than
other voters have in determining who achieves office . . . . (Such
high costs) make it impossible for groups without money to enter
the electoral arena to offer their ideas in competition with those
who can afford the price of admission.43
The possibility of corruption is not limited to the electoral pro-
cess: it pervades the entire process of government. As Erwin
Knoll stated in the January, 1972 issue of The Progressive:
One need only scrutinize the record of this (or any recent) Ad-
ministration, of this (or any recent) Congress to see how many
decisions have been shaped by gratitude for past political con-
tributions, by promises of contributions to come, or by fear of
contributions to be withheld.44
Scrutinizing the record of the Nixon administration, one finds
some curious coincidences: for example, the administration's re-
versal in raising milk subsidies shortly before receiving large cam-
paign contributions from dairy producers,45 and ITT's offer of fi-
nancial support to the Republican National Convention followed
by the favorable settlement it received from the Justice Depart-
ment in antitrust cases. Time magazine, in its October 23, 1972 issue,
as part of its lead story, included many similar examples on both
the national and statewide level. 46 One example:
The Maryland Chairman of Democrats for Nixon, Harry Rogers III,
seems to have more than an ideological interest in re-electing the
President. Announcing a drive to raise $250,000 for Nixon, he
denied that his concern stemmed from the fact that most of the
business of his land-development partnerships is with the Federal
Government. His business gets some $5 million a year from the
Government in lease payments .... Another lease and building
deal is awaiting Federal approval.4 7
The evils of campaign costs are succinctly summed up by former
in the inequity of its availability and in the commitments, however tacit,
often required to acquire it. Private wealth should not be decisive in a
democracy, either in electing an official or in influencing public policy."
43. D. DUNN, supra note 27, at 12-13.
44. KNOLL, supra note 22, at 10.
45. Milk and Money, THE NATION, Sept. 11, 1972, at 164.
46. The Disgrace of Campaign Financing, TIME, Oct. 23, 1972, at
27-28.
47. Id., at 28. One of the most straight forward and revealing state-
ments about the relation between campaign contributions and political fa-
vors was made by Kenji Osano, one of the most powerful Japanese en-
trepeneurs, who was chief political fund raiser for Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka of Japan: "Politics and business are one. They are inseparable."
The Osano Connection, TIME, Jan. 1, 1973, at 56.
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Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst in a statement before the
Subcommittee on Elections:
The cost of political campaigns are spiraling upward, causing con-
cern that only the wealthy, or those supported by powerful eco-
nomic interests, can afford to run for public office. Adding to this
concern is the widespread suspicion that the high price of cam-
paigning leads to secret agreements to exchange political favor for
financial support. These are the principal reasons for the loss of
public confidence in the integrity of the election process. The only
problem now is to agree upon effective means to restore that con-
fidence. 48
One means to restore that confidence by reducing political cam-
paign costs has been agreed upon. The Federal Election Campaign
Act 4 9 limits the amount candidates for federal offices can spend on
radio, television, CATV, newspapers, magazines, billboards and auto-
mated telephone systems in any primary, runoff, special or gen-
eral election to ten cents times the voting-age population of the geo-
graphic unit covered by the election or $50,000, whichever is greater.
A key provision is that no more than sixty percent of candidates'
funds can be spent on broadcasting. The broadcast media cannot
charge candidates more than the lowest unit rate charged any
other advertiser for the same class and amount of time for a period
of forty-five days before the primary election or sixty days before
a general election. At other times rates cannot exceed charges
made for comparable use for other purposes. In addition, the Act
tightens disclosure requirements and limits the amount a candi-
date or his immediate family may contribute. It is interesting to
note that the Senate version of the bill repealed section 315 for all
candidates for federal office, but because of opposition in the House
and White House, the final version of the bill did not repeal sec-
tion 315.
The practical significance of this Act is that the presidential can-
didates in 1972 could spend up to $14.25 million on communications
media, of which no more than $8.55 million could be spent on TV
and radio.50 President Nixon spent about half this amount on
radio and television, and Senator McGovern spent about three-
48. Hearings on H.R. 8284 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Elections of
the Comm. on House Administration on Campaign Financing, July 14,
1971.
49. Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (Feb. 7, 1972)..
50. BROADCASTING, Oct. 30, 1972, at 19.
fourths this amount.5 1
While this statute may appear effective on its face, its impact is
questionable. According to one recent article, "so far, the major
impact of the new law. . . has been to loose an avalanche of lists
and papers. . .About the only discernible result of the new law has
been to scare off some contributors who are shy of publicity. '52 In
addition, the spending limitations appear to be set too high to be
effective limits on radio and television spending.
SUSPENSION OR REPEAL OF SECTION 315
Proposals have been made to reduce the costs of political cam-
paigns while attempting to accomplish the goal of promoting the
widest and most penetrating airing of views and issues. One such
proposal is to suspend or repeal section 315, thereby allowing li-
censees to cover various campaigns more thoroughly, without fear
of equal opportunity obligations. In 1960 there was such a suspen-
sion during the presidential campaign. The facts substantiate the
theory: In 1960 Nixon and Kennedy received much more free time
from networks than Johnson and Goldwater received in 1964, or
than Eisenhower and Stevenson received in 1956. In 1956 the total
free time for the Democratic and Republican presidential aspirants
was less than thirty hours; in 1960, when section 315 was suspend-
ed, the total was almost forty hours; in 1964, the total was less
than five hours.53
Another significant development in 1960 was the series of Great
Debates, made possible by suspending section 315. While the value
of these debates has been questioned, 54 much can be said in their
favor. According to Delmer Dunn of The Brookings Institution:
Debates as an educational tool should not be lightly discarded.
They do offer higher quality information than any presently used
alternative formats . . .A suspension could also help assure that
each major candidate would have some chance of getting his
message to the voter. Thus, some of the difficulties of the present
finance system, particularly for presidential candidates, could be
51. See note 24, supra.
52. The Disgrace of Campaign Financing, TIME, Oct. 23, 1972, at 24.
For a contrasting impression of the effectiveness of this Act, see Franklin,
Campaign Spending Rules Tightened, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1972, at 22, col. 4.
53. R. MAcNErL, supra note 7, at 285-86.
54. See E. BARxouw, supra note 8, at 165:
"Critics of the Great Debates stressed their superficiality. Like
most newscasts, the programs were collections of tidbits. Major
topics had to be tucked into capsules, each without context. The
situation measured coolness and adroitness, not wisdom. The Great
Debates, said historian Henry Steele Commanger, glorified traits
having no relationship to the presidency; he was sure George
Washington would have lost a television Great Debate."
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overcome. 55 In addition, the debates caused one party to listen to
the opposing party and vice versa, which is healthy for a democ-
racy.56
In addition to the Great Debates, the suspension of section 315
allowed the networks to devote much greater coverage to Ken-
nedy and Nixon than to the minor candidates. NBC presented a
series of eight programs, "The Campaign and the Candidates," fo-
cusing on these two candidates and their running-mates. In 1964
NBC planned a similar series but suspension of section 315 had
lapsed, thereby making it impractical to include any significant ap-
pearances by major contenders.57 The particular advantage of sus-
pending section 315 was well expressed by Robert Shafer, news
director for Philadelphia television station WRC-TV:
Because it is not possible to present extensive coverage of politi-
cal activities within the framework of newscasts and news inter-
views (currently exempt from section 315) . . . many news directors
... assume additional programming responsibilities in the produc-
tion of documentary, special events, and face-to-face programs.
It is in this area of programming that section 315 has proved com-
pletely unworkable. 5
Section 315 has the effect of emasculating many election year
special broadcasts, including those which would feature minor par-
ties. CBS cancelled plans for a half-hour special on minor par-
ties in 1964 because any splinter candidate the network might have
omitted from the program could have requested equal time.5 9 Re-
cently, PBS decided not to air a satire by Woody Allen because the
film footage used shorts of President Nixon, Governor George Wal-
55. D. DUNN, supra note 27, at 100.
56. For further information regarding the Great Debates, see S. KRAUs,
ED., THE GREAT DEBATES: BACKGROUND, PERSPECTIVE, EFFECTS (1967).
57. J. PENNYBACKER AND W. BRADEN, EDS., BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1969). See also G. WYCKOFF, THE IMAGE CANDIDATES: AMER-
ICAN POLITICS IN THE AGE OF TELEVISION 256-57 (1968).
58. G. WYCKOFF, supra note 50, at 256-57.
59. See J. PENNYBACKER AND W. BRADEN, EDS., BROADCASTING AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 150 (1969). It is interesting to note that the leader of one
minor party, the Conservative party in New York, sided with broadcasters:
We discovered .... that the existence of the equal opportunity re-
quirement actually disadvantaged the minority parties through the
production of a naturally over-cautious attitude on the part of
broadcasters. Instead of giving full publicity to the minor parties,
and to the interest they inspired, the broadcasters in fact extended
the bare minimum time required, and nothing more, in order to
avoid legal complications.
D. DUNN, supra note 27, at 102.
lace and Senator Hubert Humphrey, and PBS decided not to broad-
cast the episode of "The Mouse Factory" in which Pat Paulsen ap-
peared. (Mr. Paulsen had officially declared himself a candi-
date for the Presidency.) 60 PBS's reluctance is well founded: on
January 25, 1972, the FCC held that Pat Paulsen's appearance on
an entertainment program after he had officially declared his can-
didacy did subject the broadcaster to equal opportunity require-
ments.61
The Senate, on March 23, 1972, voted to repeal section 315
insofar as it applies to presidential and vice-presidential candi-
dates.6 2  Senator George McGovern, while campaigning for the
presidency, pushed strongly for congressional action repealing
section 315, at least as it applies to presidential and vice-presiden-
tial candidates. The effect of such repeal, according to the New
York Times, would have been virtually to guarantee the Demo-
crats more than $1 million worth of free broadcast time in the
closing months of the election.68 The basis for this figure is CBS's
promise to split eight hours of broadcast time equally between
candidates Nixon and McGovern, NBC's promise of four prime-time
half-hours to be split the same way, and a similar promise by ABC.
The networks also said they would give time to candidates of any
other significant party, such as George C. Wallace's American In-
dependent Party.64
There are compelling arguments either for repeal of section 315,
or for limiting its application to major party candidates. As
Chairman Dean Burch of the FCC recently stated in a case involving
Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm:
There is a longstanding Commission proposal to amend section 315
to limit the application of 'equal time' in general elections to major
party candidates, with such candidates defined liberally so as to in-
60. PBS Reconsiders A Satire By Allen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1972, at
59, col. 4. See also N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1972, at 67, col. 3.
61. See In Re Request for Review of the Pat Paulsen Ruling Concern-
ing Section 315 Political Broadcast, Letter to Daniel Sklar, Esq. 33 FCC 2d
835 (Jan. 25, 1972). Chairman Burch, in a concurring statement, said:
To the casual observer, today's Commission action must appear to
be somewhat foolish .... (however) there is simply no room for
this Commission to make determinations as to degree of intent, or
qualifications, or 'seriousness'-nor should there be. The Commu-
nications Act bestows on us no particular expertise about the
working of the American political process.
Id.
62. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1972, at 44, col. 1.
63. Weaver, Democrats Seek End to Equal Time: Press for Free
Broadcasts without Sharing Them with Fringe Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
64. Id. See also N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 1972, at 44, col. 1.
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clude all who have significant public support. The basis of that
proposal is obvious. Equal opportunities do not get free time for
the Vegetarian or Socialist Workers or other 'fringe' parties. As
a practical matter, it just inhibits presentations of the major party
candidates (or, in the primary context, of the candidates with any
real chance of winning). The only loser is the public.6 5
Chairman Burch would limit equal opportunity to "significant
candidates" because, he says, presentation of candidates lacking
significant public support "would appear to be [of] little, if any,
public benefit."6 6
This statement demonstrates an attitude which should be scruti-
nized closely. If section 315 were to be repealed, it is clear that
broadcast coverage of the Democratic and Republican candidates
would probably increase. But what would be the effect on minor
parties? What about the possibility of biased coverage of the cam-
paign? The brief discussion of the power of television, supra,
should make self-evident the importance of considering these ques-
tions.
According to Nathan Karp, the Socialist Labor Party leader:
Nothing in the record of the overwhelming number of broadcast
licensees justifies the conclusion that they can or should be trusted
to treat all candidates for public office in keeping with the basic
principles of democracy. In the past, they have resorted to every
conceivable device to evade their legal responsibilities to the demo-
cratic process as spelled out in section 315 and the "fairness doc-
trine." If they fail to meet their responsibilities and obligations
when the law is on the books, what justification is there, or can
there be, for assuming that they will act responsibly when the law is
removed? To ask the question is to answer it.67
Facts bear this out: In 1956, minority parties as a group received
approximately the same amount of free time as the Democrats
and as the Republicans. When section 315 was suspended in 1960,
however, minority parties as a group received less than one-sixth
the free time devoted to Republicans and to Democrats.68 The fair-
65. In Re Complaint of Hon. Shirley Chisholm Against American
Broadcasting Co. and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 FCC 2d 579
(June 20, 1972).
66. Hearings on Political Broadcasting Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 8 (1972).
67. J. PENNYBACKER AND W. BRADEN, EDS., BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, 145 (1969).
68. D. DUNN, supra note 27, at 86. Mr. Dunn concludes that "Suspend-
ing section 315 would probably produce less free time for candidates of
ness doctrine did not seem to protect their rights to equitable treat-
ment.
Proposals for repeal of section 315 have assumed that the fairness
doctrine would provide adequate protection for minority parties.
For example, former Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst, in
testimony before the Subcommittee on Elections, stated, "We be-
lieve that candidates will be assured of reasonable access to broad-
casting facilities on an equitable basis by the Fairness Doctrine
enforced by the Federal Communications Commission. We, there-
fore, recommend total repeal of section 315 (a)." 69
However, such reasoning is not realistic. E. William Henry,
Chairman of the FCC in 1966, has stated that "The FCC has had
considerable experience with the administration of this [fairness]
doctrine enough to teach us that it will not do as a general set of
ground rules for broadcasting in political campaigns absent section
315.70 The fairness doctrine is not suited to solve section 315
problems because such problems arise in situations requiring im-
mediate, formula-like answers. The equal opportunity requirement
provides such a formula. The fairness doctrine, on the other hand,
based on the exclusive concept of "fair" time, can be applied only
in an after-the-fact, case-by-case, fact-finding administrative pro-
cedure. As Herbert E. Alexander so aptly put it, "There is no
equity for a candidate after an election is lost."'7
1
Furthermore, application of the fairness doctrine has not always
achieved the goal of the doctrine. As University of California at
Berkeley law professor Stephen R. Barnett recently noted, "The
gap between what the doctrine was supposed to mean and what
it means in fact has widened progressively in recent years, as the
television speech has amplified the power of the presidency and
as Mr. Nixon, in particular, has exploited it to an unprecedented
minor parties unless they were likely to receive a substantial vote."
Id., at 87.
69. Hearings on H.R. 8234 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Elections of
the Comm. on House Administration on Campaign Financing at 9 (July
14, 1971). See also M. CUMMINGS, JR., ED. (THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1964, at 152 (1966): "nothing the minor parties
did in 1964 indicates any need to give them and their candidates more
protection than they would enjoy under the fairness doctrine and the
broadcasters' competitive drive to play a full role in reporting the news-
worthy among political candidates, ideas and movements."
70. V. RAY, ED., INTERPRETING FCC BROADCAST RULES AND REGULATIONS,
66 (1966).
71. Alexander, Communications and Politics: The Media and the
Message, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 255, 267 (1969). See also Singer,
The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Neverland Revisited, 27 MD. L. REV.
221, 224 (1967).
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degree.17 2  An even more extreme view is expressed by Social-
ist Nathan Karp:
The fairness doctrine is practically meaningless since no effec-
tive effort is ever really made to enforce it, except possibly where
powerful or influential organizations are involved .... broadcast
licenses manifest a complete disregard for the "fairness doctrine,"
as far as minority parties are concerned, despite the specific em-
phasis placed upon this doctrine in the 1959 amendment. They ar-
rogantly refuse to recognize any obligation to minority party can-
didates, and invariably are upheld by the FCC in this respect.
This speaks volumes on what would happen if section 315 were
repealed and political broadcasting were left to the vagaries of the
"fairness doctrine." 73
A recent example of the truth of this statement is an FCC decision
on November 6, 1972, refusing to order ABC, CBS, and NBC to give
a free half-hour to Dr. Spock on election eve as requested by the
People's Party, who argued that the networks had violated the
fairness doctrine by failing to provide adequate coverage of Dr.
Spock's views during the campaign. The majority, in a 5-1 decision,
held that the party had not demonstrated that Dr. Spock's cam-
paign was sufficiently substantial to render unreasonable the net-
work's judgment that their coverage was adequate. Nicholas John-
son, the lone dissenter, said that the coverage of CBS and NBC
during the final three weeks of the campaign, "zero appearances
and zero minutes," does not comply with their obligations under
the fairness doctrine. 74
It is clear that repeal of section 315, or applying section 315 only
to the two major candidates, and relying on the fairness doctrine
would have a deleterious effect on minority parties. Such legisla-
tive action would hinder the growth and effectiveness of existing
minority parties and inhibit the emergence of new parties claiming
to represent plans for improved forms of government, something
which the Declaration of Independence declared to be the right and
duty of citizens to present for adoption by the people. 75 As Social-
72. Barnett, Televising the President, Part Il-The Fairness Doctrine:
How Fair? THm NATION, Aug. 7, 1972, at 78-79.
73. J. PENNYBACKER AND W. BRADEN, EDS., BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 140 (1969).
74. FCC Tells Spock: No Time Due, BROADCASTING, Nov. 13, 1972,
at 20.
75. D. DUNN, supra note 27, at 101, quoting testimony of a Socialist
Labor Party spokesman.
ist Nathan Karp stated in testimony before a Senate subcommit-
tee:
It cannot be repeated too often that creating the opportunity for
frequent presentation of the substantially identical views of the two
major parties, while at the same time suppressing, or drastically
limiting the expression of all divergent views, is the very antithesis
of democracy. It would eliminate not only an essential ingredient
of democracy-the right of proponents of new ideas to be on an
equal basis with those who defend and uphold the status quo-but
also an essential prerequisite for human and social progress, the
free competition in the marketplace of ideas.76
INCUMBENTS AGAINST REFORM OF SECTION 315
Repeal of section 315 is obviously not a proper alternative. Yet
most would agree that section 315 should be amended to achieve
the goal of informing the public more effectively. While there are
strong pressures for reform, there are also, ironically, strong pres-
sures against reform, because the political well-being of incum-
bents is closely tied to maintaining the status quo of section 315.
Between 1955 and 1970, members of Congress introduced over
thirty bills aimed at excluding from the equal time requirements,
candidates ranging from president only to all those running for
public office.77 Since 1970, there have been at least half-a-dozen
such proposals. 78 None of these bills have become law, with the
exception of the experimental suspension of section 315 during the
1960 campaign.
Incumbents have a vested interest in section 315 for several rea-
sons. An incumbent's activities are widely covered on exempt
newscasts, while a non-incumbent's activities are not. Repeal would
increase pressure on incumbents to debate challengers on televi-
sion or radio; incumbents are generally reluctant to do this.79 Pres-
ident Kennedy was willing to debate his Republican opponent in
1964, but when he was assassinated, President Johnson indicated
76. J. PENNYBACKER AND W. BRADEN, EDS., BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 141 (1969). It should be noted that third parties must overcome
difficult requirements for registration or getting a candidate on the ballot
even before the problem of publicity arises.
77. D. DUNN, supra note 26, at 47.
78. See, for example, S. 3178, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R. 14274,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R. 15387, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), H.R.
5090, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), H.R. 6112, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
H.R. 6841, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), H.R. 7911, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), H.R. 11231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), H.R. 8628, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971).
79. See Weaver, Democrats Seek End to Equal Time: Press for Free
Broadcasts Without Sharing Them with Fringe Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
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he did not wish to debate with Senator Goldwater, and a previous
Congressional vote to suspend section 315 was effectively killed.8 0
The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1964, had no doubt "that Presi-
dent Johnson himself engineered the Senate vote on equal time,"''
and that Congressmen were "sure not ready" to lay "their political
lives in the laps of the broadcasters. '8 2
As indicated above, another advantage to an incumbent is that
section 315 does not apply to him until he officially announces his
candidacy. This explains the many television appearances of
President Nixon in the two weeks before he announced his candi-
dacy on January 7, 1972, and President Nixon's reluctance to de-
clare himself a candidate in an interview with newsman Dan Rather,
even though he could not have made his candidacy much clearer.8 3
This was buttressed by the recent Supreme Court refusal to re-
view the Court of Appeals' denial of a right of response to the
Democratic National Committee when the president is not yet a
candidate (three speeches in early 1971).84 Two FCC decisions
are said to be "perfectly designed to buttress the President's strat-
egy.'85 President Nixon does not feel comfortable in news con-
ferences. The FCC holds that news conferences are not exempt
from section 315-so President Nixon has an excuse to avoid news
conferences. 86 The second holding is that when a president reports
to the nation on a matter of national concern, no equal time is re-
80. See G. WYCKOFF, supra note 51.
81. Blundell, Law Intended to Promote Political Broadcasts Inhibits
Them, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 9, 1964.
82. Id.
83. According to the New York Times, "Mr. Nixon refused the oppor-
tunity offered by Dan Rather ... to announce his candidacy formally.
But the President . . .conceded later that there was 'good reason to think
that I might make the decision in that direction.'" Semple, Nixon Indi-
cates He'll Run with Agnew on the Ticket, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1972, at
1, col. 1.
84. BROADCASTING, Oct. 16, 1972. See also Letter to Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 40 FCC 395 (1964) (Loevinger dissent). For an in-
teresting contrast, see In Re Complaints of Committee for the Fair Broad-
casting of Controversial Issues, 19 R.R. 2d 1103 (1970) in which the FCC
held that an imbalance was created when five free prime time broadcasts
by the party in power was not counterbalanced by an opposing viewpoint.
85. Barnett, Televising the President: Equal Time & The Nixon
Style, THE NATION, June 26, 1972, at 807.
86. NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 1972, at 1.
quired.8 7 President Nixon used many such speeches.88  There are
those who trace the political composition of the FCC and see these
decisions as tailored to favor President Nixon.89
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
It seems that every writer who has studied section 315 and the
surrounding problems has a different solution. Since the authors
will attempt an eclectic approach combining their own proposals
with those of others deemed to have continuing merit, we mention
here only two or three plans (actually drafted as amendments)
which we do not believe are necessary or productive. The first
is to exempt debates from section 315. One would apply only to
television. Another includes radio.9' The purpose is to encour-
age or force debate. It has been proposed that two candidates de-
bate in a news interview.9 2 This was thought to be exempt from
section 315,93 under the theory of "fullest presentation of the
news. '9 4 But the later case of Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm
seems to require that where the "news" is so scheduled as to fea-
ture the two major contenders,9" equal time must be provided a
third candidate where the scheduling time and format makes these
real debates.9 6 The debate amendment might be unnecessary
with some clarification of these decisions. Another proposal would
87. See Letter to Republican National Committee, 40 FCC 408 (1964),
aff'd., Case No. 18963 (C.D. Cir. Oct. 27, 1964); cert. denied, 379 U.S. 893
(1964).
88. BARNETT, supra note 78. It is interesting to note the following
statement of Senator J.W. Fulbright: "As matters now stand, the Presi-
dent's power to use television in the service of his policies and opinions
has done as much to expand the powers of his office as would a constitu-
tional amendment formally abolishing the co-equality of the three branches
of government. Hearings of S.J. Res. 209 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
89. BARNETT, supra note 78, at 809.
90. G. WYCKOFF, supra note 51, at 262.
91. Geller, Political Broadcasts-A Few Short Steps Forward, 20
CATH. U.L. REv. 449, 454 (1971).
92. See Alexander, Communications and Politics: The Media and the
Message, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 255, 269 (1969).
93. In Re Complaint by Hon. Sam Yorty, 35 FCC 2d 570 (June 3, 1972);
In Re Complaints of Hon. Sam Yorty Against Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., Hon. Shirley Chisholm against American Broadcasting Co. and
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 FCC 2d 572, 576 (June 2, 1972).
94. In Re Complaints of Hon. Sam Yorty Against Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc., Hon. Shirley Chisholm Against American Broadcasting
Co. and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 FCC2d 572, 576 (June 2,
1972).
95. In Re Complaint of Hon. Shirley Chisholm Against American
Broadcasting Co. and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 FCC 2d 579
(June 3, 1972).
96. FCC and U.S.A., No. 72-1505, quoted at Id.
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make equal time available only to major canididates, e.g. those who
receive four percent of the popular vote in the preceding national
election. This would have excluded Roosevelt in 1912, LaFollette
in 1924 and Wallace in 1948.97 Some would lower the percentage
to one or two percent.98 This is believed to be too difficult to en-
force and may be constitutionally discriminatory.
The author's proposed solution deals with four areas: (a) gov-
ernmentally funded broadcast time; (b) regulation of broadcast
time that is given by the media; (c) tax reform; and (d) sanc-
tions and total spending regulation. These areas would include
the following elements:
(a) Governmentally funded broadcast time: 1. Adoption of the
candidate categories and specified broadcast times of the "voters'
time" proposal based on the idea presented by the Twentieth Cen-
tury Fund Commission on Campaign Costs in the Electronic Era
in 1969. 99 Under this system of Voters' Time, as opposed to equal
time, the federal government provides significant candidates in
general election campaigns for president and vice-president with
basic campaign broadcasting access to the American voting public
within the context of programs that will promote rational politi-
cal discussion, and that will be presented in prime evening time
simultaneously over every broadcast and cable television facility in
the United States.100 This proposal is the subject of House Resolu-
tion 6112, which fixes a system of major, third and minor parties.10 1
We would apply the same system to Congressional, and even to
state candidates.
Within the context of the various Voters' Time proposals, the key
element is "significant candidates." The characterization of "signi-
ficant" encompasses candidates who are nominees of parties that
support the same candidate for president and vice-president in at
least three-fourths of the states and qualify electors for those same
97. See 35 FCC 2d 579, 580. It is interesting to note that in an opinion
by Chairman Burch in which three other Commissioners concur, it is ar-
gued that "If and when it [the FCC denial of relief] is considered on its
merits, in the context of the full factual record, I believe it should be sus-
tained." Id.
98. G. WYCKOFF, supra note 51, at 255.
99. VOTERS' TIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND COMMIS-
SION ON CAMPAIGN COSTS IN THE ELECTRONIC ERA (1969).
100. Id.
101. H.R. 6112, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 15, 1971).
candidates on the ballot in that proportion of states provided that
the electoral votes of those states are sufficient to elect a presi-
dent and vice-president.
Among the groups of candidates characterized as "significant,"
three categories are drawn. Category I includes significant candi-
dates nominated by parties that ranked first or second in the popu-
lar vote in two of the three previous presidential elections. Cate-
gory II includes significant candidates that are nominated by par-
ties that received at least one-eighth of the popular vote in the pre-
ceding presidential election. Category III includes all other signif-
icant candidates.
Category I candidates are entitled to six prime-time thirty min-
ute programs within the thirty-five days preceding the Monday be-
fore Election Day, provided that at least one program be broadcast
in each seven day period. Category II candidates are entitled to
two such programs with the same restrictions. Category III candi-
dates are entitled to only one such program.
This "Voters' Time" would be paid for by the Federal Govern-
ment at no more than fifty percent of the commercial rate charged
for such time or the lowest charge made to any commercial adver-
tiser for such time, whichever is lower. "Voters' Time" would be
exempted from section 315. As originally made, this proposal does
not preclude candidates from buying time other than the time
given them in "Voters' Time."
The proponents contend that this proposal recognizes dual needs:
"a healthy chance for the upward movement of new parties and
candidates and the possible decline of the old, as well as the stabil-
ity provided by a strong two party system." Dividing candidates
into three categories leaves the door open to new parties whose per-
spective on new circumstances may be of great value to the people.
If "Voters' Time" were in effect in the past, the following parties
would have fallen within Category II: Roosevelt's Bull Moose
Party in 1916, LaFollette's Progressive Party in 1924, and George
C. Wallace's American Independent Party in 1972. The following
parties would have been in Category III: Henry A. Wallace's Pro-
gressives in 1948, Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party in 1912,
and the Socialist Party of Eugene V. Debs and Norman Thomas,
which would have qualified seven times. Dr. Spock's party would
not qualify.
Presenting each program simultaneously over every broadcast
and cable television facility in prime evening time would enhance
the possibility of all voters perceiving the candidates. The idea of
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simultaneity is borrowed from the English system, which has proved
successful in this respect.
(b) Regulation of broadcast time that is furnished by the
media. 1. Adoption of a proportional (as opposed to equal) time
requirement, based on the "Voters' Time" categories of candi-
dates.10 2 This would work as follows: If a broadcaster gave one
hour of free time to Category I candidate, he would be obligated
to give one hour of time to every other Category I candidate, one-
half hour to every Category II candidate, and five minutes to every
Category III candidate. If a broadcaster gave one hour of free time
to a Category II candidate, he would be obligated to give the same
time to other 'Category II candidates, a half-hour to Cateogry
I candidates, and five minutes to Category III candidates. Giving
free time to any Category III candidate would not subject the broad-
caster to equal opportunity provisions. This scheme would en-
courage dissemination of the views of the fringe parties, pro-
voke broadcasters to give all candidates more time, reduce cam-
paign expenses, and inform the public more effectively. The pro-
portions alloted to each category could be modified so as not to place
too great a burden on broadcasters; and, of course, a station could
give an evolving candidate who would not qualify otherwise
free time.10 3
The above would seem superior to a fixed percentage man-
dated free time,10 4 or dependence on "public service,"'1 5 or insis-
tance on networks giving greater free time,106 or paralleling bought
time by free time for minor parties 0 7-all of which raise a ques-
tion of confiscation,'0 " or serious policy as no other industry is so
regulated. 0 9
102. H.R. 7911, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 15387, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972).
103. H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN PoLiTics 273-74 (1972).
104. Id., at 274.
105. Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never-Neverland Revisited,
217 MD. L. REv. 221, 249 (1967).
106. Eisenhower, The Ticklish Problem of Political Fund Raising and
Spending, READER'S DIGEST, Jan. 1968, at 68.
107. R. MAcNEIL, supra note 7, at 286.
108. Geller, Political Broadcasts-A Few Short Steps Forward, 20
CATH. U.L. REV. 449 (1971).
109. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Com-
mittee on Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 152 (1967).
2. Adoption of the English system of non-campaign rebuttal
time. Application of rebuttal time proportional to the time which
an incumbent uses on television or radio before he officially de-
clares his candidacy is suggested by the English system.110 For
example, as a result of President Nixon's one hour interview with
Dan Rather a few days before the President officially declared his
candidacy, the Democrats would be given equal time to use as they
saw fit, and Category II and III candidates could be given lesser
time.
The New York Times, in an editorial on January 6, 1972,111 sug-
gested the English system as a model to be followed, particularly
with respect to the time before the incumbent officially declares
himself a candidate:
The 'British political system (whereby the leader of the opposition
is routinely asked to make an equivalent appearance whenever
the incumbent Prime Minister appears on television) with its in-
stitutional opposition, makes the exercise of fairness on television
much easier. At the moment, half a dozen Democrats are vying
to be recognized as the future leader of Mr. Nixon's opposition.
Nevertheless, it is not beyond the inventive powers of the FCC
to devise an arrangement by which a President's opposition across
the whole political spectrum regularly and routinely receives ac-
cess to free television time equal to that which he receives. This
recurrent squabble over equal time is one controversy which
should have been settled in a mature democracy. 112
3. Removal of the "news" exception favoring incumbents and
expansion of the "issue oriented fairness" doctrine with extremely
quick methods of review. AS said, section 315 attempts to be auto-
matic. Whether a "news" appearance should be answered should not
depend on an automatic formula. If the "news" is essentially politi-
cal, issue-oriented, it should be answered. But we cannot tolerate
the delays of the existing "fairness" rule. At the same time we
need the fairness doctrine advantages-emphasis on broadcasting as
a public trust, concern that controversial issues be aired and under-
stood, the right of non-candidates to reach the public." 3
(c) Tax reform. 1. Adoption of amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code that would provide tax incentives for broadcasters
110. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 103, at 263. Such arguments may be pre-
cluded by the precedent of 315, which mandates free time. A distinction
must be drawn, however, because 315 mandates free time only when the
station first offers free time, whereas this proposal would mandate free
time even in the absence of any such prior action by the licensee.
111. For a more detailed description of the English system, see J. BLUM-
LER AND D. MCQUAIL, TELEVISION IN POLITICS: ITS USES AND INFLUENCE
(1969).
112. GELLER, supra note 104.
113. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1972, at 36, col. 1. See also Ney, Politics and
Commercials, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1971, § 3, at 15, col. 1.
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for providing free time to candidates.
Under this proposal, the Internal Revenue Code would be
amended to permit broadcasters to deduct from taxable income not
only out of pocket costs of free political broadcasts (which are cur-
rently deductible) but some portion of the profits which are there-
by sacrificed. This would be a further inducement to broadcasters
to provide free time to candidates. A caution must be added-the
advantage to the broadcaster must not be so great as to substitute
them as the new "fat cats" of the parties.
2. Amendments of the current Internal Revenue Code provi-
sions that provide tax incentives to citizens for making campaign
contributions.
Small amounts should be fully deductible, but large contributions
refused a deduction. We want to encourage the average citizen
to contribute more to political campaigns, and reduce the impact
of the "fat cats." It might even be provided that contributions
above a certain amount would give rise to taxable income (many
now give low cost stock and avoid tax on the gain).
3. Alternatively, abandonment of the entire tax incentive system
with the government collecting a fund and disbursing the same
to provide for broadcast time for all parties.
This was the proposal of the Twentieth Century Fund Commis-
sion on Campaign Costs in the Electronic Era. An even more
extensive reliance on this method was Rexford Tugwell's sugges-
tion. 1 4 The current tax provision allowing a one dollar credit on
the 1972 tax return for a special Federal fund is a half-way step,
still coupled to designating one's party preference.
(d) Regulation of total amount of campaign spending and sanc-
tions. 1. Amendment of the Federal Election Campaign Act to
lower the ceiling on campaign spending generally and the propor-
tion which can be spend on broadcasting.
This would necessarily decrease the fantastic cost of running
for public office and the evils generated by that cost, so long as
114. A good analysis of why the broadcast industry cannot be expected
to take the lead while Congress continues to favor its own members, in
discussing proposals for structuring content and greater use of "short pro-
gram" and "spot" coverage of issues is in Political Broadcasts and the
Informed Electorate: A Call for Action, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 177 (1972).
the disclosure requirements of the Act were strictly enforced. The
existing Act and the Pastore proposal are inadequate. It may be
all right to retain a provision limiting spending to some amount
per registered voter, but there should also be a dollar limit, which-
ever is lower (not higher, as at present).
2. Imposition of substantial fines on any candidate and/or con-
tributor over one hundred dollars where any advantage was
obtained from the government by the contributor or related per-
sons within five years of the contribution, and for any failure to
disclose contributions or their expenditure.
Watergate and all the numerous "front" committees and failures
of disclosure ought to convince us of the need for penalties with
teeth.
Finally, for once the political incumbents should stop providing
for their own protection. The emphasis should shift to the citi-
zen's right to be informed and to vote intelligently. 15 It is too much
to expect that we can at once produce a law that is free from trouble
and favoritism. We have tried to show why throwing out section
315 entirely would bring a cure worse than the disease, why the
fairness doctrine alone is inadequate. But we have learned, or
should have learned, from our operations under the existing law.
The proposal advanced here is by no means the only solution, but
it is based on the lessons of experience. This proposal merits care-
ful scrutiny. Certainly, Congress should revise section 315 and
attempt to resolve the problems before the 1974 elections.
115. Some criticisms and suggestions for modifying the fairness doc-
trine to accomplish the original intent of 315 has been voiced earlier in this
article. A full recent discussion and proposals to get around such present
problems as "no requirement that the time given be equal nor that the time
be given to any particular persons" is found in W.C. CANBY, JR., The
First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television,
19 U.C.L.A. REv. 723 (1972).
